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PREAMBLE
In 1972 the Committee on Viral Hepatitis of the 
Division of Medical Sciences, National Academy of 
Sciences-National Research Council, published a state­
ment on the public health implications of hepatitis B 
surface antigen in human serum.1 The statement was 
revised and updated in 1974.2 These commentaries dealt 
with the significance of hepatitis B surface antigen and 
suggested ways to manage hepatitis B patients and other 
persons found to have this antigen in their blood.
Recent data on the diagnosis, epidemiology, and 
management of hepatitis B have helped clarify its 
complex natural history. Important questions remain to 
be answered, but there is sufficient new information to 
warrant thorough review of the subject and interpreta­
tion of its health significance.
Traditional prevention and control of hepatitis A 
involve good hygienic practices and passive prophylaxis 
(immune serum globulin, human—ISG) for close per­
sonal contacts of hepatitis patients. For control of 
hepatitis B, in view of its only partially understood 
natural history and epidemiology, we rely on estab­
lishing personal and environmental barriers to trans­
mission. At present, ISG appears to be of limited value 
as a preventive of hepatitis B; therefore, considerable 
effort is being directed toward the development of 
biologies for both active and passive immunization.
In order fully to consider the current implications of 
hepatitis B, both in clinical and public health practices, 
the Committee on Viral Hepatitis is joined in the 
following statement by the Public Health Service Ad­
visory Committee on Immunization Practices. Since 
1968, this latter group has considered the control of 
viral hepatitis in its recommendations on use of ISG and 
has become increasingly cognizant of the need for 
hepatitis B control in addressing the community manage­
ment of viral hepatitis.
The following perspectives and recommendations are 
based on facts known about hepatitis B, sound general 
principles of containment of infectious diseases, and 
judgments on the interpretation and significance of 
antigenemia in hepatitis patients and other persons.
EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
Viral hepatitis, type B, is of major public health 
importance in the United States. The number of cases 
reported have been increasing steadily since 1966, the 
first year hepatitis B was differentiated from hepatitis A 
in reports to the Center for Disease Control (CDC). In 
1975 approximately 55,000 cases o f viral hepatitis were 
reported, more than 20% of them diagnosed by report­
ing physicians as type B. This proportion is clearly an 
underestimate since data from national surveillance and 
studies of hospitalized adult patients indicate that up to 
50% of acute icteric viral hepatitis in adults may be 
caused by hepatitis B virus (HBV).
CLINICAL AND LABORATORY ASPECTS
Hepatitis B cannot readily be distinguished from 
other types of viral or toxic hepatitis, and tests of liver 
function do not differentiate them.
Typical acute icteric hepatitis B has an incubation 
period of approximately 2-3 months (range, 6 weeks-6 
months). The prodromal phase begins with malaise, 
anorexia, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, and mental depres­
sion. Elevated serum transaminases, glutamic oxalacetic 
(SGOT) and glutamic pyruvic (SGPT), develop early in 
the prodrome. Symptoms often begin insidiously rather 
than abruptly; urticaria and/or arthralgia may occur. 
Icterus appears in 1-2 weeks or somewhat later and is 
usually accompanied by anorexia; icterus generally 
persists for 1-2 weeks. Full recovery may take several 
months; the patient is often fatigued but otherwise has a 
sense of well being.
Icteric hepatitis B may be associated with consider­
able debility; on rare occasions, it progresses to fulmi­
nant hepatic necrosis. The death-to-case ratio of icteric 
hepatitis B reported to CDC is 1%; depending on age and 
underlying health, it may occasionally be as high as 10%.
Anicteric hepatitis B is at least 2-3 times more 
common than the icteric form. It is often diagnosed as 
gastroenteritis or some other viral syndrome.
Hepatitis B Surface Antigen (HBsAg)
Patients with acute hepatitis B have hepatitis B 
surface antigen (HBsAg) detectable in blood, usually for 
1-8 weeks. This antigen is protein from the outer coat or 
surface of HBV. Its presence indicates a potential for 
infectivity.
HBsAg was first identified by immunodiffusion. This 
is a simple, inexpensive laboratory technique with great 
specificity, but one that is time-consuming (1-3 days) 
and relatively insensitive. So-called second generation 
procedures including counterimmuno-electrophoresis, 
complement fixation, and passive hemagglutination are 2 
to 10 times more sensitive than immunodiffusion and 
much faster (30 minutes to several hours). Third 
generation tests such as radioimmunoassay and reversed 
passive hemagglutination are at least 100 times more 
sensitive than immunodiffusion and are recommended 
for HBsAg screening. Sensitive techniques are currently
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used in most blood banks and many health department 
and hospital laboratories.
HBsAg appears during the incubation period, pre­
ceding clinical or biochemical evidence of infection by 
several weeks. It persists during early symptomatic 
illness and usually disappears before liver function 
returns to normal. Antibody to HBsAg (anti-HBs) is first 
detectable late in convalescence and indicates complete 
or partial immunity to subsequent hepatitis B infection.
Five to ten percent o f hepatitis B patients have 
HBsAg in their blood for many months, even years, 
some of them progress to chronic active hepatitis and 
cirrhosis. Patients who are asymptomatic or have mild 
disease are more likely to have persisting antigenemia 
than those with icterus. Persistent antigenemia is also 
seen in persons with impaired or immature cellular or 
humoral immune systems. These include hemodialysis 
patients, children with Down’s syndrome in institutions 
for the mentally retarded, patients on immunosuppres­
sion, and infants whose mothers had hepatitis B during 
pregnancy.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Hepatitis B used to be called “ serum hepatitis” and 
was thought to be transmitted only by parenteral routes 
such as inoculation or transfusion of blood or blood 
products. Recent evidence indicates that HBV is spread 
in other ways as well: Experimental studies have 
established that oral administration of serum containing 
HBV can cause hepatitis; observations in non-experi- 
mental settings have shown that this can also occur 
naturally. Although HBsAg has been detected in many 
human biologic fluids during acute infection, transmis­
sion of disease by saliva or other body fluids containing 
antigen has not yet been convincingly demonstrated. 
Evidence for person-to-person spread of hepatitis B 
includes the spread of infection among mentally re­
tarded persons in institutions and transmission of disease 
to household or other intimate contacts of patients with 
hepatitis B or persons with persistent antigenemia.
Although adult volunteer blood donors are not 
representative of the United States population, 1-5 per 
1,000 of them have HBsAg and thereby are considered 
potentially infectious. This and other observations on 
the prevalence of antigenemia in selected groups indi­
cates that there is only a very small risk of hepatitis B for 
most people. However, HBV infection is more likely for 
those whose occupation (e.g., hospital, laboratory, and 
other health care personnel) or household exposure 
results in close and continued contact with. HBsAg- 
positive persons. For example, a high risk of acquiring 
hepatitis B has been reported for patients and staff in 
hemodialysis units, hematology-oncology units, surgery 
units, and for workers in clinical pathology laboratories 
and plasma fractionation facilities.
Transmission of HBV is either direct—when an 
infectious individual is in physical contact with a 
susceptible person—or indirect—when the infectious and
susceptible persons are separated and HBV is transferred 
by contaminated substance or object such as blood or 
needle.
Direct transmission is the principal mechanism of 
infection for household contacts of patients with acute 
hepatitis B (primarily spouses) and for workers in certain 
occupations. HBV can enter the body orally, through 
mucous membranes, or percutaneously. Blood or serum 
is most often responsible for infection. (Since HBsAg has 
also been demonstrated in saliva and other body 
substances, these might also transmit the agent.)
Indirect transmission is the principal mechanism of 
infection for persons exposed to HBV by blood trans­
fusion, sharing contaminated needles in self-injection of 
drugs, and other such parenteral means. Tattooing, ear 
piercing, using multiple dose syringes, and handling 
blood-stained towels have been implicated. Oral ■ ex­
posures such as mouth pipetting infective substances 
have also caused hepatitis B. Airborne and vector-borne 
mechanisms of spread of HBV have been postulated but 
never proven.
CONTROL AND PREVENTION
Widespread application of serologic tests for HBsAg 
have underscored the significance of hepatitis B as a 
clinical and public health problem. HBsAg in the blood 
of a patient or of an apparently healthy person raises 
questions not only of the presence of liver disease but 
also of the risk of transmitting infection to others. Only 
limited data are presently available to assess the extent 
of this risk, but it is clear that not all HBsAg-positive 
persons spread infection. The likelihood of transmitting 
HBV to susceptible contacts is related to many factors 
including personal hygiene, aseptic technique, protective 
clothing, state of mind, etc.
Recommendations for limiting the spread of hepatitis 
B have emphasized minimizing exposure to sources of 
infection. They have focused on improving personal and 
environmental hygiene, disease surveillance, public 
education, and the safety of blood transfusion. These 
have been partially successful.
Several prospective studies of transfused patients 
show that the incidence of transfusion-associated hepa­
titis B has been significantly reduced by the required 
testing of every unit o f blood for HBsAg by a method of 
third generation sensitivity (either RIA or RPHA). 
Nevertheless, there remain a small number of cases 
presumably due to transfusion of blood contaminated 
with HBV but with insufficient HBsAg for detection 
with the most sensitive tests currently available.
An additional benefit of the advent of HBsAg testing 
of blood donors has been definitive identification of a 
3-10 times greater prevalence of HBsAg contamination 
of blood collected from paid donors than in blood from 
volunteer donors. The term “paid donor” is used here to 
describe a donor whose economic status or life-style 
greatly increases the likelihood that his blood is infec­
tive. It does not include donors who are paid for 
regularly contributing low-risk blood for special pur­
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poses. Most cases of transfusion-associated hepatitis 
appear to be caused by an agent, or agents, other than 
HAV or HBV. They are reasonably called non-A, non-B 
hepatitis cases. The risk of non-A, non-B hepatitis is also 
much greater from paid donor blood than from volun­
teer donor blood. Therefore, currently the most effec­
tive means of further reducing the risk of transfusion- 
associated hepatitis is elimination, to the extent feasible, 
of blood from paid donors.
Eliminating commercialism in acquiring blood for 
transfusion is one of the key objectives of the National 
Blood Policy. (This policy was announced by HEW in 
1973 and is supported by the American Blood Commis­
sion, formed in 1975.) In order to provide information 
regarding relative safety to physicians prescribing and 
patients receiving blood transfusions, the Food and Drug 
Administration published a proposal in the Federal 
Register in November 1975.3 This proposal would 
require that all units of blood be labeled to identify the 
donors as paid or volunteer. Labels would also state that 
blood from paid donors is associated with a higher risk 
of hepatitis than blood from volunteer donors. Such 
labeling requirements are already in effect in California 
and Illinois. In Illinois there has been a dramatic 
reduction in the use of blood from paid donors and, 
based on one study, an equally dramatic reduction in the 
incidence of transfusion-associated hepatitis.
Definitive control or prevention of hepatitis B awaits 
development of biologies for active and passive immuni­
zation or other specific measures. In the meantime, we 
must continue to rely on general measures to reduce the 
chances of exposure and on sound practices for contain­
ing infection when the risk of hepatitis B is great.
General Recommendations
The following recommendations offer guidance to 
those living or working where there is a risk of hepatitis 
B infection; they can be applied to all settings or 
environments. (Recommendations tailored to specific 
settings will be presented later.)
Personal Hygiene: Good personal hygiene is the 
keystone of protection against hepatitis B infection. The 
single most important practice is careful handwashing. 
This combined with the common-sense avoidance of 
likely sources of infection are fundamental in hepatitis B 
control.
Disinfection and Sterilization: Most data on inactiva­
tion of HBV are from studies conducted prior to the 
discovery of the HBsAg in 1965. And many of these 
studies are deficient in that they involved too few 
volunteers. In recent years there have been limited 
opportunities to study the effects of physical and 
chemical treatments on HBV infectivity. This is because 
animals that can serve as models for HBV studies are in 
short supply and HBV has never been adapted to a tissue 
culture system.
HBV in blood plasma or serum appears to be quite 
stable and is capable of withstanding wide ranges of
temperature and humidity and a variety of chemical 
agents. Its infectivity persisted for 15 years at -20°C, 6 
months at room temperature, and 4 hours at 60°C. In a 
1:10 dilution of serum, infectivity was destroyed by 
boiling for one minute although antigenicity was not 
altered.
The following methods for disinfection or steriliza­
tion are recommended either because of proven effec­
tiveness in volunteer studies, demonstrated destruction 
of immunological reactivity of HBsAg, or, on an 
empirical basis, because of known biocidal activity of the 
particular treatment.
Heat sterilization is the treatment of choice for 
instruments and other objects that can conveniently be 
handled this way. The importance of thoroughly 
cleansing instruments, containers, or surfaces, etc. to 
remove adherent material before treatment cannot be 
overemphasized. HBV has been shown or is expected to 
be inactivated by heat under each of the following 
conditions:. 1) boiling in water (100°C) for 10 minutes,
2) steam under pressure (autoclaving) at 121°C and 15 
pounds per square inch pressure for 15 minutes, or
3) dry heat (160°C) for 2 hours.
Alternatives to  heat, presumed to be effective, in­
clude some chemical disinfectants: 1) solutions of 
sodium hypochlorite, 0.5% to 1.0% (5,000-10,000 ppm 
available chlorine) for 30 minutes, 2) 40% aqueous 
formalin (16% aqueous formaldehyde) for 12 hours; 
formalin, 20% in 70% alcohol, 18 hours, 3) 2% aqueous 
alkalinized glutaraldehyde for 10 hours, and 4) gas 
sterilization with ethylene oxide (check manufacturer’s 
recommendations).
Immune Serum Globulin: There have been conflict­
ing results from the many well-designed studies evalu­
ating the efficacy of ISG in hepatitis B prophylaxis. 
Most commercial lots available before 1972 appeared 
to be ineffective in preventing or modifying parenterally 
acquired hepatitis B. The lack of effect of these ISG 
preparations was presumed to be due to the absence or 
low levels of anti-HBs. By contrast, more than 90% of 
samples of ISG manufactured after 1972 were found to 
have some anti-HBs. Although there was considerable 
variation in the titers of anti-HBs among lots tested, 
titers were generally greater than in pre-1972 lots.
ISG with detectable but low levels of anti-HBs has 
been shown to reduce the clinical severity and complica­
tions of HBV infection when the virus inoculum was 
small and the exposure either percutaneous or oral. 
Therefore, ISG with anti-HBs could be of value in 
hepatitis B prophylaxis under some conditions of ex­
posure.
ISG with high anti-HBs titers (1 :200,000-1:500,000 
passive hemagglutination—PHA), hepatitis B immune 
globulin (HBIG), has been evaluated in a few investiga­
tional trials in settings with various kinds of exposure 
and found to provide significantly greater protection 
against hepatitis B than ISG with intermediate or low 
anti-HBs titers (<  1:5,000 PHA). It is expected that
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HBIG will be licensed for specified uses; guidelines for 
use are under development.
As has been stated, standard ISG appears to provide 
only limited protection against hepatitis B under some 
conditions of exposure. It is therefore recommended 
that ISG manufactured after 1972 be offered to indi­
viduals who clearly have had an oral or percutaneous 
exposure to known HBsAg-positive blood or fluids (e.g. 
accidental ingestion or accidental needle punctures). The 
best available data on dosage suggest that, for an adult, a 
single 5 ml intramuscular injection may be of benefit.
Reporting and Education: Every case of hepatitis 
should be tested for HBsAg and reported promptly to 
the local or state health department. Reporting of 
confirmed cases permits more accurate hepatitis sur­
veillance, identification of changes in epidemiologic 
trends, and community-wide prevention and control 
measures.
HBsAg-positive persons and their close contacts 
should be fully informed about HBV and how to limit 
its spread. This education is especially important for 
health care professionals since they often have continual 
exposure to sources of possible infection (patients, 
blood, body fluids, etc.).
Recommendations for Minimizing Transmission 
in Specific Settings
The risk of acquiring hepatitis B is greatest for 
persons who frequently encounter hepatitis patients or 
specimens containing HBsAg. Generally speaking, the 
highest risk involves a few specific household and 
hospital settings. Before considering them in detail, and 
to avoid redundancy, some general comments can be 
made.
Regardless of the setting, patients and human bio­
logical specimens should be managed carefully because 
some will present an unrecognized hepatitis risk. To 
protect susceptible patients and staff, blood and other 
specimens from hepatitis patients and HBsAg-positive 
persons should be labeled as such and optimally be 
enclosed in impermeable bags. Charts o f these patients 
should be flagged (e.g. “ Hepatitis B,” “ blood and 
instrument precautions,” etc.). All persons involved, 
patients and staff, should practice careful handwashing 
and personal hygiene.
Specific recommendations should be tailored to the 
particular setting and reflect the unique aspects of each 
environment:
Household: Within the household, spouses and other 
intimate contacts of patients with acute hepatitis B or of 
asymptomatic HBsAg-positive persons appear to have 
the greatest risk of infection. It is important that all 
household contacts know how hepatitis B is transmitted 
and that blood and possibly other body fluids, if 
HBsAg-positive, might spread HBV infection. In addition 
to practicing good personal hygiene (especially hand­
washing), they also need to handle and dispose of
blood-contaminated articles carefully and avoid practices 
which might increase the opportunity for infection such 
as sharing razors, toothbrushes, towels, washcloths, or 
other personal items.
Hospitals: General Patient Care Area: Hepatitis B 
has spread from patients to staff in intensive care units, 
transplant units, hematology-oncology wards, and 
general medical-pediatric and surgical wards. Neverthe­
less, patients with acute hepatitis or HBsAg-positive 
persons in these environments generally need not be 
placed in isolation; they can be cared for in semi-private 
or ward accommodations providing blood and instru­
ments are handled with the precautions discussed earlier. 
When handling blood or blood-contaminated objects 
from HBsAg-positive patients, staff should wear gloves 
and possibly other protective clothing as well. During 
procedures which could result in splattering or splashing 
infective material, a surgical-type mask or facial covering 
to protect eyes, nose, and m outh has value. Disposable 
needles and syringes, proper sterile technique, and 
adequate sterilization and chemical disinfection pro­
cedures are important to control percutaneous spread.
Laboratories: Clinical biochemistry and hematology- 
serology laboratories, hepatitis research laboratories, and 
autopsy laboratories are recognized to be settings where 
hepatitis B transmission occurs. Common exposures are 
accidentally pricking the skin with instruments con­
taminated with HBV, pipetting infective fluids, contami­
nating cuts or scratches with infective blood or splashing 
it in eyes or mouth. Contamination may result from 
shaking specimens, homogenizing, opening screw-cap 
bottles, blowing the last drop of fluid from a pipette, 
pouring fluids, and centrifuging. Mouth pipetting, 
smoking, and eating in the laboratory are dangerous 
practices and should be forbidden. Protective clothing, 
including gloves and facial coverings (if there is danger of 
splashing), may be appropriate. This is especially impor­
tant when performing autopsies on HBsAg-positive 
persons. Gloves and other protective clothing must be 
properly used (changed frequently, especially when 
contaminated or torn) and should not be considered a 
substitute for careful technique and good personal 
practices. Work areas should be thoroughly cleaned and 
disinfected daily. All laboratory accidents resulting in 
HBsAg exposure must be promptly reviewed with regard 
to need for environmental decontamination and personal 
prophylaxis.
Laboratories should specify that potentially infective 
specimens be properly packaged and labeled. It may be 
useful for them to have a designated safety officer who 
keeps records of laboratory accidents, educates person­
nel in methods of control and prevention, and peri­
odically evaluates and updates safety procedures.
Hemodialysis Units: Hemodialysis units present a 
great risk of hepatitis B for patients and staff. Most 
infections in patients are subclinical, and a large per­
centage of them result in persistent HBsAg-positivity. 
Staff commonly have overt hepatitis, often hampering 
operations.
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HBV can be introduced into the units by patients, 
staff, or infective blood, plasma, or blood products. 
Once seeded, HBV can be spread among patients and 
staff by personal contact or parenteral exposure.
Surveillance: Continuous surveillance of patients and 
staff for HBV infection is essential. Those who are 
seronegative should be tested periodically for HBsAg, 
anti-HBs, and, possibly, SCOT and/or SGPT. The fre­
quency of testing depends on whether hepatitis B is 
occurring. If no hepatitis B infections among patients or 
staff develop in 6-12 months of testing, routine sampling 
intervals of 2-4 months would be reasonable. If antigen 
or antibody does appear, HBV spread is probably 
occurring, and more frequent (e.g., monthly) sampling 
should be undertaken.
It is useful to screen new hemodialysis patients and 
staff for HBsAg and anti-HBs before admission to the 
unit. This provides baseline information on their suscep­
tibility or potential infectiousness and the need to 
institute precautions.
Records: Detailed records of patient management 
(e.g., machine and other equipment assignments and 
dates of use) will be essential to determine whether any 
infections are related to specific procedures. Records 
should also include complete descriptions of mishaps 
(needle punctures, membrane leaks-ruptures, etc.).
Staff: Highest quality aseptic technique is funda­
mental to prevent HBV spread. Protective clothing 
should be used but changed on a regular basis and 
whenever obviously contaminated. It should not be 
worn outside the unit. Using gloves during procedures 
where there is contact with blood such as handling 
shunts, drawing blood, or cleaning or dismantling dialy­
sis machines, has been shown to decrease the risk of 
HBV infection. A fresh pair of gloves should be used 
with each patient. However, gloves are not a substitute 
for good technique and proper personal hygiene. Sur- 
gical-type masks or other facial coverings may decrease 
the risk of infection when splattering of blood occurs. 
Abrasions, lacerations, and other breaks in the skin 
should be bandaged to protect them from contact with 
infectious material.
Operating Procedures: Operating procedures should 
minimize the amount of close personal contact among 
patients and staff. Overcrowding is to be avoided, and 
individual equipment and supplies used whenever pos­
sible. Patients and staff should not eat, drink, or smoke 
in the immediate hemodialysis area.
Susceptible patients should be separated from known 
HBsAg-positive patients or those whose antigen status is 
unknown. If practical, staff should be assigned to attend 
HBsAg-positive or HBsAg-negative patients, but not 
both, during the same shift. Staff with anti-HBs might 
preferentially be assigned to HBsAg-positive patients. 
Until their antigen/antibody status is known, new 
patients should be managed in areas separate from these 
being used for chronic hemodialysis.
After each use, equipment which cannot be heat or 
gas sterilized should be washed to remove adherent 
material and cleaned with a disinfectant solution. Non- 
permeable disposable diaphragms can prevent contami­
nation of equipment such as venous pressure monitors.
Institutions for the Mentally Retarded: Viral hepa­
titis, both sporadic and epidemic, has long been known 
to occur in custodial institutions for the mentally 
retarded and poses a risk for both patients and staff. The 
risk of infection appears to increase with the duration of 
instutionalization. Practical precautions are needed to 
reduce transmission of HBV from HBsAg-positive men­
tally retarded residents to persons such as teachers, 
classmates, and parents who come in close personal 
contact. In general and until more definitive information 
on the infectiousness of persons with HBsAg becomes 
available, it is important to avoid placing unwarranted 
limitations or restrictions on HBsAg-positive retarded 
persons.
Surveillance: Serologic surveys of institutionalized 
persons are not considered necessary as a routine 
procedure. However, in institutions where hepatitis B 
infection has been shown to be endemic, periodic 
screening of residents will be helpful in identifying 
high-risk areas, in investigating hepatitis outbreaks, and 
in evaluating the effectiveness of control measures.
Since persons who are antigen-positive may become 
negative even after 6 or more months of positivity, each 
HBsAg-positive person should be retested periodically to 
determine whether the antigen persists. Once seroconver­
sion to anti-HBs occurs, any specific hepatitis precau­
tions can be removed.
Control Measures: Parents and personnel responsible 
for the care of institutionalized mentally retarded 
persons must be aware of the need for good hygienic 
practices. This is especially important after caring for 
open wounds or having contact with blood or blood- 
contaminated fluids and before eating or handling food. 
Personal toiletry articles should not be shared. No 
special procedures need be observed for laundering 
clothing or linens, although all blood-contaminated 
items should be handled with appropriate precautions 
(gloves, etc.). No other restrictions need be imposed on 
antigen-positive residents when they participate in rou­
tine activities such as special education programs and in 
nursery, day care, or foster care facilities.
Physicians, dentists, laboratory workers, and others 
providing care for known antigen-positive persons should 
be so advised so that adequate precautions can be 
exercised during patient contact or specimen handling. 
Because of the likelihood of contact with unrecognized 
HBsAg-positive persons or specimens, health workers in 
institutions should always be alert to the risk of hepatitis 
B and use appropriate protective measures.
Community Placement Programs, Nursing Homes:
Because residents of institutions for the retarded more 
frequently are HBS Ag-positive than non-institutionalized 
populations, they should be tested for HBsAg before
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transfer to other institutions or discharge to community 
placement programs or nursing homes. Information on 
their antigen status will alert health personnel and others 
who have close contact with them in community 
programs to use precautions when there is a risk of 
hepatitis B. HBsAg-positive persons should be given the 
same consideration for placement programs or nursing 
homes as those who are negative. Parents and personnel 
in contact with antigen-positive retarded persons should 
be informed of the risk of hepatitis B and given 
instruction in control and prevention. (HBsAg-positive 
residents in community programs should be managed as 
are those in institutions; see above.)
Management of High-Risk Persons and 
Populations
Certain persons and groups, particularly those in­
volved in health care, are at greater risk than the general 
population of acquiring hepatitis B; this is because of 
occupational and environmental exposures. Since most 
hepatitis B infections are subclinical and 5%-10% of 
those infected may develop persistent HBsAg, there may 
also be an increased risk of hepatitis B for the general 
population brought into contact with HBsAg-positive 
individuals in health care settings. Precautions against 
spreading HBV infection currently depend on awareness 
of personal risks and use of good hygienic practices.
Management of persons with persistent HBsAg who 
work in environments and under circumstances where 
there are many chances for transmitting HBV infection 
(e.g., regular contact with blood, involvement with 
parenteral and surgical procedures, etc.) require special 
consideration. As has been emphasized, the presence of 
HBsAg is sufficient reason for personal precautions, but 
not necessarily evidence of a substantial hepatitis risk for 
contacts or associates. It is extremely important to 
prevent misunderstanding and unreasonable management 
of persons or population groups with HBsAg. Since it 
now appears that individuals who have persisting HBsAg 
may become negative even after 6 or more months of 
positivity, each antigen-positive person should be re­
tested periodically (e.g., every 6 months) to determine 
whether antigen persists.
General Recommendations: Persons working where 
there is a high risk of hepatitis B infection (especially 
hemodialysis or hematology-oncology units and clinical 
laboratories) need to be fully aware of the risks and to 
use good hygienic practices to minimize any chance for 
infection. It is reasonable to keep such “high risk” 
population groups under serologic surveillance for hepa­
titis B infection in order to be able to detect and 
investigate problems as quickly as possible. On the other 
hand, there is no need to routinely test health profes­
sionals and hospital employees not working in high-risk 
areas.
Health personnel observed to be HBsAg-positive 
should not be restricted from patient contact solely on 
the basis of this serologic finding. Rather, their personal 
procedures and practices should always reflect an aware­
ness of the potential for transmitting HBV and include 
rigorous efforts to reduce any chance that transmission 
might occur. Knowing that contact with blood or serum 
containing HBV is the likely cause of hepatitis B 
infections, scrupulous aseptic technique, avoidance of 
personal hand injuries, and use of gloves in office-based 
minor surgery, dental procedures, wound dressing, etc. 
have obvious value.
Health personnel clearly associated epidemiologically 
with HBV transmission obviously pose a greater risk for 
patients and associates and must be evaluated carefully 
with respect to continuing risks. In these instances, more 
restrictive measures (e.g., limiting or eliminating some 
types of procedures or contact with patients) may be 
needed. Obviously, each such episode will have to be 
dealt with separately and recommendations and control 
measures tailored to the specific conditions.
Health Care Personnel (Dentists, Nurses, Physicians, 
Technicians, Etc.): Recent investigations of hepatitis B 
among contacts of antigen-positive health personnel 
demonstrate that HBV transmission does occur but 
seems to be very rare. There appears to be considerable 
variation in the likelihood that persons with persistent 
HBsAg will spread infection. The risk depends in part on 
the kind and extent of contact with susceptibles. In the 
few instances where epidemiologic evidence linked 
health workers in specific hospital or dental environ­
ments to hepatitis B cases, infection seemed to have 
been caused by a presumably minute amount of blood 
or serum which was transferred during routine pro­
cedures. Minor hand injuries have generally been thought 
to be the source of infective blood which then is 
introduced by oral or percutaneous routes.
Food Handlers: There is no evidence that HBsAg- 
positive food handlers pose a health risk to the general 
public, and transmission of hepatitis B by food has not 
been documented. Nonetheless, it is prudent to restrict 
food handlers with acute hepatitis B from working while 
ill. Food handlers with persistent HBsAg, like all 
antigen-positive persons, should be educated about HBV 
transmission, the need for attention to good personal 
hygiene, avoidance of hand injuries, etc.
Pregnant Women: Women with hepatitis B infection 
during pregnancy sometimes transmit the infection to 
their infants. The risk is highest when an acute illness 
occurs during the third trimester. Infected newborns 
who may be HBsAg-negative at birth generally become 
HBsAg-positive 1 to 2 months later in the absence of 
clinical hepatitis. Most infants who become HBS-Ag- 
positive develop persistent HBsAg, and many eventually 
have histopathologic evidence of inflammatory liver 
disease. For these reasons, seronegative pregnant women 
working in high-risk environments should be transferred 
to work areas where the risk is lower for the duration of 
pregnancy.
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